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As used in federal securities laws, disgorgement describes the act of restor-
ing unlawful profits.' Although the term is of modem vintage, it is akin to
the ancient principle of restitution whereby an unjustly enriched party must
restore benefits received to an aggrieved party.2 The goal of both disgorge-
ment and restitution is to make wrongdoing unprofitable. The critical dis-
tinction between the two remedies, however, is the extent to which that goal
is pursued and accomplished.'
Traditionally, restitution is a private remedy sought by a defrauded party
seeking restoration of a personal loss caused by the wrongdoing of another
1. One definition provides:
Disgorgement is an equitable remedy designed to deprive defendants of all gains
flowing from their wrong, rather than to compensate the victims of the fraud. The
purpose of disgorgement is to deter violations by making them unprofitable, not to
make investors whole (which can only be effectuated through a private action for
damages).
1 A E. GADSBY, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, pt. IA, § 9.03(2), 9-57 to 9-58 (1984) (footnotes
omitted). Although the word disgorgement means simply the act of giving up money, Gad-
sby's definition, which is founded on the notion that the remedy is not designed to make pri-
vate parties whole and includes a deterrent factor, is directly applicable to suits by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). See SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir.
1978); SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1309 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers,
Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Penn Central Co., 425 F. Supp. 593, 599
(E.D. Pa. 1976); SEC v. Golconda Mining, 327 F. Supp. 257, 259-260 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See
infra notes 11-13, 122, 129-32 and accompanying text.
2. See generally Cheney & Sibears, Disgorgement in SEC Insider Trading Cases, 26
B.B.J. No. 10, 7-8 (1982); Ellsworth, Disgorgement In Securities Fraud Actions Brought By the
SEC, 1977 DUKE L.J. 641, 651-52 (authors discuss the inherent equitable distinctions between
restitution and disgorgement).
3. See SEC v. Commonwealth Chemical Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978). The
court noted that restitution is an equitable remedy "by which defendant is made to disgorge ill-
gotten gains or to restore the status quo, or to accomplish both objectives." Id. at 95. In
comparison, when disgorgement is employed "the court is not awarding damages to which
plaintiff is legally entitled but is exercising the chancellor's discretion to prevent unjust enrich-
ment." Id.
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party.4 This remedy prevents an aggrieved party from suffering an unjust
loss while precluding a wrongdoer from retaining the fruits of misconduct.-
If private parties traded securities as they do common articles of merchan-
dise, courts would generally have no need to fashion remedies for securities
violations in a manner different from traditional restitutional decrees.6
The complex machinery of the securities marketplace, however, precludes
broad application of basic restitutional principles in all instances of securities
fraud.7 This is so because securities are typically bought and sold in an im-
personal market where buyers and sellers generally do not transact "face-to-
face."' Securities trading is generally carried out through geographically
disperse secondary market systems and transactions are completed through
a web of third parties including issuers, underwriters, brokers, and inves-
tors.9 This elaborate trading machinery creates ample opportunity for un-
4. At common law, restitution denoted the return or restoration of a specific thing or
condition. Holloway v. People's Water Co., 100 Kan. 414, 423, 167 P. 265, 270 (1917). In
modern use, however, restitution is not necessarily confined to the return of something of
which one has been deprived, but may include compensation for loss, damages or injury to
another. See, e.g., Basile v. United States, 38 A.2d 620 (D.C. 1944).
5. See generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAWS OF REMEDIES § 9.3, at 617
(1973) (restitution requires that both parties be placed in status quo ante as though the fraudu-
lent transaction never occurred).
6. See Galigher v. Jones, 129 U.S. 193, 200 (1889):
Other goods wrongfully converted are generally supposed to have a fixed market
value at which they can be replaced at any time; and hence, with regard to them, the
ordinary measure of damages is their value at the time of the conversion, or, in the
case of sale and purchase, at the time fixed for their delivery. But the application of
this rule to stocks would, as before said, be very inadequate and unjust.
Id. Accord SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963):
There has also been a growing recognition by common law courts that the doctrines
of fraud and deceit, which developed around transactions involving land and other
tangible items of wealth, are ill suited to the sale of such intangibles as advice and
securities, and that, accordingly, the doctrines must be adapted to the merchandise in
issue.
Id. (footnote omitted)
7. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1933) (Congress noting that securities
are "intricate merchandise" and that the securities market is a "complex mechanism").
8. In Diamond v. Dreamuno, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 248 N.E.2d 910 (1969), the New York
Court of Appeals noted the inherent difficulty faced by a private litigant when seeking restitu-
tion for securities fraud because securites are characteristically traded through "anonymous
transactions, usually handled through brokers, and the matching of the buyer with the ulti-
mate seller presents virtually insurmountable obstacles." Id. at 85, 248 N.E.2d at 915.
9. The secondary market system refers to the trading of securities on "exchanges" and
"over-the-counter markets." "The Intermarket Trading System (ITS) links seven stock ex-
changes and enables brokers and "market makers" to interact with one another in their respec-
tive efforts to obtain the best current price for particular securities. The ITS is comprised of
the New York, American, Boston, Cincinnati, Midwest, Philadelphia, and Pacific exchanges,
as well as the National Association of Securities Dealers Quotation System (NASDAQ) (a
computerized pricing mechanism used for certain widely traded over-the-counter securities).
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scrupulous investors to defraud the marketplace often leaving aggrieved
parties unaware of their dupery, its extent, or its antecedent.10 Under cir-
cumstances where impersonal fraud is conducted through "market transac-
tions," as opposed to private face-to-face transactions, the aggrieved parties
are unable to identify the perpetrator of the fraud if indeed they are aware
that they have been wronged.
Because restitution requires both an identifiable wrongdoer and an ag-
grieved party it is an inappropriate, if not impossible, remedy to apply in
many instances of securities fraud. Certainly, a defrauded party cannot seek
restitution against an unknown perpetrator. Moreover, it is often difficult,
given the nature of the securities industry, to identify a single investor as
having suffered a calculable loss.11
As a result of the limitations on restitution as a remedy in cases of securi-
ties fraud, some courts have developed the disgorgement remedy, a form of
redress designed primarily to deprive securities law violators of ill-gotten
gains and to deter future violations rather than to compensate aggrieved pri-
vate parties.12 Disgorgement's remedial breadth is founded upon goals un-
"Over-the-counter" refers to the trading of securities not conducted on an exchange. See B.
WHEELER, THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE FACT BOOK, 11, 18 (1983).
10. See generally SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock and Call
Options of Santa Fe Int'l. Corp., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
98,323 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). In that case, the SEC sought to freeze profits derived from allegedly
fraudulent trading practices. Purchases of 3,000 call options and 35,000 shares of Santa Fe
common stock were effected by unknown persons through various brokerage accounts shortly
before merger negotiations were announced between Santa Fe and Kuwait Petroleum Corp.
All of the shares and most of the options were sold at an increased aggregate value of over $5
million within the two week period following the announcement. Corporate entities through
which the transactions were effected were named as nominal defendants but the identities of
the fraudulent investors were never ascertained.
11. See Diamond, 248 N.E.2d at 915; see also Golconda Mining, 327 F. Supp. 257
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). In Golconda Mining the defendants unsuccessfully contended that a portion
of their tainted profits should be returned to them because some of the claimants could not be
identified or located. The district court stated:
[In a suit] commenced by the SEC as a law enforcement agency, .. to permit the
return of the unclaimed funds, a portion of the illicit profits, would impair the full
impact of the deterrent force that is essential if the adequate enforcement of the se-
curities acts is to be achieved.
Id. at 259.
12. See, e.g., SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting that the purpose of
disgorgement is to divest the wrongdoer of ill-gotten gains rather than to compensate the vic-
tims of fraud); Commonwealth Chemical, 574 F.2d at 102 (disgorgment "is a method of forcing
a defendant to give up the amount by which he was unjustly enriched"); Cheney & Sibears,
supra note 2, at 12 ("A court in ordering disgorgement is exercising its equitable power to
provide relief suited to the myriad situations presented to it."); see generally Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Comm. v. Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211, 1221-23, (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921
(1979) (disgorgement under Commodity Exchange Act); SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F.
Supp. 1225, 1250 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (disgorgement of value of franchise which corporate officer
19851
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restricted by limitations applicable to cases of pure restitution. 13
The disgorgement remedy has been applied in suits to compel restoration
of illicit profits gained through "insider trading."' 4 Insider trading is a
broad term used to describe the unlawful trading of securities on the basis of
material information that is not generally available to the investing public. '"
By using material, nonpublic information to purchase or sell publicly traded
securities, the inside trader defrauds anonymous investors who are concur-
rently making investment decisions without the benefit of that same informa-
tion. 16 Private parties who become aware that they have been duped by
insider trading may bring suit to compel the inside trader to disgorge wrong-
ful profits derived through use of the nonpublic information.17
Alternatively, or in addition to private suits, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC or Commission) may seek disgorgement of illicit gains in
order to redress wrongdoing and deter securities fraud.' 8 As statutory
had received free of charge during fraudulent scheme), aff'd, 556 F.2d 559 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 855 (1977); SEC v. Jet Travel Serv., 1975-76 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 95,317, at
98,609 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (disgorgement of proceeds from fraudulent offering of securities).
13. SEC v. Penn. Central Co., 425 F. Supp. at 599 ("Disgorgement contemplates total
recovery from the wrongdoer, not recovery that may be partial or limited to a few of the total
number injured or subject to a compromise of actual damages."). Accord SEC v. Management
Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1975); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 747-49 (8th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Haines v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 428 F.
Supp. 435, 441 (D. Md. 1977);.
14. See, e.g., SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983); SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d
1301 (2d Cir. 1974). See also infra notes 123-33, 146-75 and accompanying text.
15. See generally III L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION, 1445-74 (2d ed. 1961); Dooley,
Enforcement ofInsider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1 (1980).
16. See, Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders and Informational Advantages under the Federal Se-
curities Law, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1979). Commenting on the insiders' advantage, Brud-
ney stated:
The inability of a public investor with whom an insider transacts on inside infor-
mation ever lawfully to erode the insider's informational advantage generates a sense
of unfairness ...
The unfairness is not a function merely of possessing more information-outsiders
may possess more information than other outsiders by reason of their diligence or
zeal-but of the fact that it is an advantage which cannot be completed away since it
depends upon lawful privilege to which [other investors] cannot acquire access.
Id. at 346.
17. See, e.g., Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st. Cir.) cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965);
see also, Elkind v. Ligget & Myers Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980); Fridrich v. Bradford, 542
F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977); Dolgow v. Anderson, 464 F.2d
437 (2d Cir. 1972); Matarese v. Aero-Chatillon Corp., 1971-72 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,322 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Bubolz v. Burke, 266 F. Supp. 686 (E.D. Mo. 1967).
18. The SEC first won the right to compel disgorgement of ill-gotten gains in 1970. See
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 92-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Prior to 1970,
however, the Commission had achieved consensual restitution in a number of cases by means
of "friendly persuasion." See, e.g., Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943) (Com-
mission dropped enforcement action when violators agreed to make restitution); see also SEC
[Vol. 34:445
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guardian of the federal securities laws, the SEC may act as a "public plain-
tiff" and seek disgorgement of all tainted profits to prevent the wrongdoer
from retaining unjust enrichment.1 9 The Commission's power to seek dis-
gorgement of insider profits was established over a decade ago;2 ° yet, the
appropriate measure of disgorgement in these public enforcement actions re-
mains unsettled.2 1
The early SEC disgorgement cases involving insider trading under rule
lOb-5 were primarily concerned with the question of whether the Commis-
sion had the requisite power to seek ancillary relief in the form of disgorge-
ment of profits, rather than the question of measuring the liability itself.
22
Although the measure of disgorgement was not initially the major issue in
SEC insider trading actions, 23 the first federal circuit court to apply the dis-
gorgement remedy did so in a private suit and required disgorgement of the
v. Skagit Valley Tel. Co., SEC Litigation Release No. 3393 (Dec. 21, 1965); SEC v. First Inv.
Co., SEC Litigation Release No. 281 (June 20, 1945); The Commission's policy of friendly
persuasion was sharply criticized by securities law expert professor Louis Loss. Professor Loss
argued that the general equity powers of federal courts gave the SEC the requisite legal power
to compel disgorgement and that the Commission had been overly cautious in not pursuing
this form of ancillary relief. See 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1827-29 (2d ed. 1961).
19. See Commonwealth Chemical, 574 F.2d at 95 (noting that in SEC suits the court is not
awarding damages to which a plaintiff is entitled but is exercising its discretion to prevent
unjust enrichment). See also 41 SEC ANN. REP. 97-98 (1975). In its annual report to Con-
gress, the SEC expressed its major objectives:
The SEC's primary function is to protect the public from fraudulent and other
unlawful practices and not to obtain damages for injured individuals. Thus, a re-
quest that disgorgement be required is predicated on the need to deprive defendants
of profits derived by their unlawful conduct and to protect the public by deterring
such conduct by others.
Id. See also SEC v. Petrofunds, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). In Petrofunds, deny-
ing the defendants plea for a jury trial, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York noted:
[There is a] critical distinction between actions brought by the SEC and actions
brought by private litigants. Regardless of the fact that the defendants may be re-
quired to disgorge profits, the SEC in no way stands in the shoes of a private litigant
with respect to its claims for ancillary relief. Indeed, the entire thrust and purpose of
an SEC enforcement action is to expeditiously safeguard the public interest ....
The claims for relief asserted in such an action stem from, and are colored by, the
intense public interest in SEC enforcement of these laws.
Id. at 960.
20. See supra note 18.
21. See SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir 1983) (en banc); see also infra notes 146-
75 and accompanying text.
22. See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1004 (1971); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005
(1971). See also infra notes 84-108 and accompanying text.
23. Before the measure of insider profit is determined, liability for insider trading must be
established. This is a highly complex issue and beyond the scope of this article. It involves
establishing, at a minimum, that the insider acted with "scienter," that the information was
1985]
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insider's entire profit.24 Thus, the inside trader disgorged all the gains that
accrued from the time of purchase to the time of the sale of the tainted
stock.25
In SEC enforcement actions, however, federal courts began assessing lia-
bility based upon profits accrued as of the date that the inside information
used by the wrongdoer became generally disseminated to the public, thus
requiring only partial restoration of insider trading profits.26 The approach
terminating liability at the time the information becomes public has been
termed "equal footing," and was utilized in subsequent cases by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit where the fraudulent traders
failed to unload tainted securities in a timely fashion and thus, eventually
sold at a net loss.27 Application of equal footing in these cases required
disgorgement of "paper profits"-money never realized by the wrongdo-
ers-to compensate for the lost investment opportunity created by holding
securities prior to the date that the material information became publicly
disseminated.28 These holdings extended the disgorgement remedy in fur-
therance of the SEC's public law enforcement role because the sum of dis-
gorgement was not equated with actual gains of the perpetrators or losses
suffered by specific investors.
Recently, in SEC v. MacDonald,29 the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit applied and adopted the equal footing principle in a deci-
sion that allowed the inside trader to retain speculative gains accruing be-
yond the public disclosure period. In MacDonald, three members of an en
banc panel held equal footing to be the proper measure of the inside trader's
liability, reasoning that public disclosure breaks the causal link between the
act of insider trading and subsequent stock value accretion.30 In other
words, the court permitted the inside trader to keep profits resulting after the
disclosure of the nonpublic information because, at that point, the securities
"material," and that the trader was an "insider." See generally Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255
(1983): Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
24. See Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); see
also infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
25. See Janigan, 786 F.2d at 786.
26. See Mitchell, 446 F.2d at 105; Texas Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d at 1308-09.
27. See Shapiro, 494 F.2d at 1309; Commonwealth Chemical, 574 F.2d at 102; see also
infra notes 124-33, 134-43 and accompanying text.
28. See Shapiro, 494 F.2d at 1309. The Second Circuit noted that insider trading deprives
other traders of not only actual profits made by the insider "but also of the opportunity to sell
when the price was much higher. We see no reason why the injured shareholders should not
be compensated for this 'lost opportunity.' " Id.
29. 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983) (en banc).
30. Id. at 52-55.
[Vol. 34:445
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were no longer held on the basis of inside information. 31
In dissent, two justices called for disgorgement of all profits, contending
that the SEC's presence as statutory law enforcer requires full disgorgement
to promote fair play in the marketplace and to deter fraud.32 The dissent
argued that the measure of insider liability in a Commission suit should be
commensurate with what would make society whole, rather than damages to
which a private party would be entitled.3 3 MacDonald was the first federal
circuit court case to explore fully the role of disgorgement in the context of
an SEC enforcement action brought against rule lOb-5 inside traders. The
court's holding and dissent represent the dichotomy of approaches to mea-
suring insider liability in Commission suits and to date, the case stands as
the most extensive judicial discussion of this issue.
This Comment will explore the issue of measuring insider liability in the
context of actions in which the SEC, rather than a private plaintiff, seeks
redress through federal courts under rule lOb-5. Specifically, this Comment
will consider whether the measure of disgorgement should include a concept
of public equity to account for damage done to investor confidence and to
provide a deterrent mechanism against insider trading. This Comment will
adopt the view recently set forth in the MacDonald dissenting opinion and
argue that the SEC's presence as a "public plaintiff" requires full disgorge-
31. "When a fraudulent buyer has reached the point of his full gain from the fraud,
viz., the market price a reasonable time after the undisclosed information has become
public, any consequence of a subsequent decision, be it to sell or retain the stock, is
* ' ' not causally related to the fraud."
699 F.2d at 54. Cf Bamel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571, 574-76 (4th Cir.) (failure to act promptly
precluded defrauded sellers of securities from receiving benefits of a stock split occurring after
they had learned of the fraud), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1969).
32. MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 55-58 (Coffin, C.J. & Bownes, J., dissenting).
33. The dissenting judges stated:
Unlike a private plaintiff, the SEC does not sue for injury to itself; nor does it sue
solely for the losses of sellers immediately injured by the defendant's fraud. Rather,
it sues for the whole injury inflicted by the fraud. That injury includes the damage
done to investor confidence and the integrity of the nation's capital markets, and is
necessarily greater than the profits at issue in a private suit. I agree that the SEC in a
civil enforcement action may seek only 'remedial' and not punitive relief. But even if
disgorgement must be strictly 'compensatory' to be 'remedial' (and I believe it need
not be), society simply is not made whole by the court's measure of disgorgement.
Id. at 55. Other courts have consistently recognized significiant differences between an SEC
enforcement action and a private damages suit under securities laws. See, e.g., Parklane Ho-
siery Co. v. Shore, 539 U.S. 322 (1979) (jury trial unavailable in SEC suit for disgorgement of
profits); SEC v. Management Dynamics, 515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting that the
SEC appears in litigation as a "statutory guardian" seeking to enforce federal securities laws);
SEC v. Lum's Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (showing of reliance unnecessary
in SEC enforcement action); In re National Student Mktg. Litig., 368 F. Supp. 1311, 1319
(J.P.M.D.L. 1973) (Weinfeld, J., dissenting) (noting that the SEC's "sole purpose" is the effica-
cious safeguarding of the public interest).
1985]
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ment, both to make wrongdoing unprofitable and to assist the Commission
in its ongoing war against insider trading. Most importantly, this Comment
will conclude that the MacDonald majority erred in treating the SEC as a
private plaintiff by implicitly resorting to principles of restitution in fashion-
ing its equal footing remedy. In so doing, the majority ignored the policy
underlying the disgorgement remedy, the SEC's role as guardian of the se-
curities industry, and the Commission's interest in reproaching the inside
trader in a manner that achieves the maximum prophylactic effect.
I. HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF RULE lOb-5 INSIDER TRADING
In the era of economic turmoil following the stock market crash of 1929
and the great depression of the 1930's, Congress enacted the first compre-
hensive federal securities laws designed to promote fair play and curb fraud-
ulent practices in the securities industry.34 Codified primarily in the
Securities Act of 193335 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,36 these
laws were promulgated in the wake of congressional findings of widespread
abuse of power and trust in the marketplace. 37 To eliminate opportunities
for such abuses the Acts were premised on the principle of full disclosure, a
philosophy now inherent in modern securities laws. a8 Under this principle
34. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (Modern securities
laws were "a series of Acts designed to eliminate certain abuses in the securities industry,
abuses which were found to have contributed to the stock market crash of 1929 and the de-
pression of the 1930's") (footnote omitted).
35. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77bbbb (1982). The Securities Act regu-
lates the initial distribution of securities to the investing public.
The basic purpose behind this bill is to protect the fair and honest public. The
basic policy is that of informing the investor of the facts concerning the securities to
be offered for sale in the interstate and foreign commerce and providing protection
against fraud and misrepresentation.
S. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1933).
36. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78111 (1982). The Securities Ex-
change Act regulates the purchase and sale of securities after the initial distribution in what is
known as the "secondary market" or public markets. See also Investment Company Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80 a-1 to a-64 (1982); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-I
to b-21 (1982).
37. The 1934 report of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, the committee
charged with investigating corrupt activities within the marketplace, stated:
Among the most vicious practices unearthed at the hearings before the subcom-
mittee was the flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by directors and officers of
corporations who used their positions, to aid them in their market activities. Closely
allied to this type of abuse was the unscrupulous employment of inside information
by large stockholders who, while not directors and officers, exercised sufficient con-
trol over the destinies of their companies to enable them to acquire and profit by
information not available to others.
S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934).
38. The basic purpose of the securities acts is "to protect investors by promoting full
[Vol. 34:445
Measure of Disgorgement
Congress sought to achieve adequate investor protection by requiring com-
plete and accurate disclosure of material information relating to the distribu-
tion and sale of securities in order to promote informed and intelligent
investment decisions.39
Full disclosure, of course, could not eliminate all fraudulent practices, and
recognizing this, Congress enacted a number of antifraud provisions
designed to eliminate cunning and deceitful practices.' Additionally, Con-
gress enacted a specific statutory prohibition, section 16(b)41 of the 1934
disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment decisions." SEC v. Ral-
ston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953). To achieve this objective the 1933 Act makes it
illegal to offer or sell to the investing public unless the shares have been registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. What constitutes the "investing public," however, de-
pends upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case. "The focus of inquiry should be
on the need of the offerees for the protection afforded by registration." Id. at 127. Accord-
ingly, courts look to factors such as publicity surrounding the offering, size of the offering,
number of offerees, offeree's degree of investing sophistication, and whether offerees had access
to the kind of information normally disclosed in a registration statement. See, e.g., Mary S.
Krech Trust v. Lakes Apartments, 642 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1981); Hill York Corp. v. American
Int'l Franchises, 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971).
39. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933). In a message to Congress,
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt stated:
There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist the every issue of new securities
to be sold in the interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full publicity and
information, and that no essentially important element attending the issue be con-
cealed from the buying public.
Id.. Full disclosure is considered a means of achieving a variety of beneficial policies. See, e.g.,
Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 201 (ensuring that investment advisors make full and frank disclo-
sure to their clients); Fridich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 324 (6th Cir. 1976) (deterring fraud
and compensating investors), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977); SEC Release No. 3230 (May
21, 1942) (protecting investors); 5 A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10B-
5 § 6.00-6.09 (2d. ed. 1981) (maintaining free securities markets, ensuring equal bargaining
strength, building investor confidence, equalizing access to information). But see Douglas &
Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171 (1933):
But even the whole truth cannot be told in such simple and direct terms as to make
investors discriminating. A slow educational process must precede that. Those who
need investment guidance will receive small comfort in the balance sheets, statistics,
contracts, and details which the prospectus reveals. . . .[T]o expect that the judg-
ment of investors as respects these imponderable factors will improve perceptibly in
this generation is baseless optimism.
Id. at 171-72.
40. Antifraud provisions are generalized prohibitions against "fraud or deceit" or "ma-
nipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances". See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, § 17(A), 15
U.S.C. § 77q(A) (1982); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b) and rule lOb-5, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1984); see infra notes 44-45; § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78(o)(C)
(1982); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 206, 15 U.S.C. 80b-6 (1982).
41. 15 U.S.C. 78p(b) (1982). Section 16(b) provides in part:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to
the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and
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Act, which was aimed directly at insider trading. Section 16(b) mandates
restoration of all profits realized by an officer, director, or ten percent benefi-
cial shareholder of a corporation who buys and sells that corporation's stock
within any six month period.4 2 This provision operates irrespective of
whether the use of material, nonpublic information can be demonstrated.
Although Congress hoped that section 16(b) would have a broad prophy-
lactic effect, by virtue of the mechanical nature of its provisions, its utility is
limited to those transactions its language specifically covers.4 3 Obviously,
not all insider trading is carried out by corporate insiders trading within a
six month period. To capture insider trading that eludes the dragnet of
section 16(b), courts began using the general antifraud provision of the 1934
Act, section 10(b) 4 and rule lOb-545 promulgated thereunder.4 6
Rule lob-5 insider trading occurs when securities are traded on the basis
purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security)
within any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good
faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recover-
able by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner,
director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased
or of not repurchasing the security sold for the period exceeding six months.
Id. Section 16(b) suits are normally instituted by the corporation to which the insider owes a
fiduciary duty; however, any stockholder, after making formal demand on the corporation,
may institute the action in a derivative suit. See R. FROME & V. ROSENZWEIG, SALES OF
SECURITIES BY CORPORATE INSIDERS 229-230 (2d ed. 1975).
42. See, e.g., Biau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786, 791 (2d Cir. 1960) (section 16(b) liability
attaches to corporate insider irrespective of any waiver or disclaimer of profits); Adler v.
Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 847 (2d Cir. 1959) (prohibition operates even though the insider in-
volved was a director only at the time of the sale and not at the time of the purchase); Smolowe
v. Delendo, 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1943) (section 16(b) does not require matching of stock
sales with purchases; lowest price in, highest price out measures the wrongful profit).
43. In Altamil Corp. v. Pryor, the court noted that § 16(b) demarcates clear unambiguous
liability, irrespective of good faith considerations, in order to create a "prophylactic effect."
405 F. Supp. 1222, 1224 (S.D. Ind. 1975).
In Adler, however, the court noted that § 16(b) "let many fish out of the net" and that "[i]ts
bite is sharp only in the limited area of transactions it covers . . . but for the insider who waits
six months and one day after purchase to avoid a short term gain there is no 'bite' at all." 267
F.2d at 845. Section 16(b), nevertheless, did have an impact on insider trading. A four-year
study beginning in 1935 indicated that insiders did not consistently buy at low prices and sell
at high, and generally they did not make exceptional trading profits. See Smith, Managment-
Trading and Stock Market Profits, 13 J. Bus. L. 103 (1940). For an exhaustive discussion of
§ 16(b), see Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARV.
L. REV. 385 (1953). See also Meeker & Cooney, The Problem of Definition in Determining
Insider Liabilities under Section 16(b), 45 VA. L. REV. 949 (1949); Rubin & Feldman, Statu-
tory Inhibitions upon Unfair Use of Corporate Information by Insiders, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 468
(1947).
44. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982), is the
general authorizing statute under which the SEC is empowered to prescribe rules and regula-
tions necessary to protect investors from deceptive practices. It provides:
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of material nonpublic information.47 Such trading is deemed unlawful be-
cause it contravenes the principle of full disclosure by leaving "outside" in-
vestors at an unfair informational disadvantage in the marketplace.48 As it
relates to rule lob-5 insider trading, the disclosure principle requires that
insiders possessing inside information either disclose that information or ab-
stain from trading.49 Thus, under rule lOb-5, it is the act of trading that
It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange ....
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the pub-
lic interest or for the protection of investors.
Section 10(b) received very little attention during the House debates concerning the enact-
ment of the securities acts, and its draftsman, Thomas Corcoran, casually described it as mean-
ing "Thou shalt not devise any other cunning devices." Hearings Before the Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1934).
45. Rule lOb-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1982) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exhange,
(1) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a mate-
rial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) To engage in any act, practice, or course of busines which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
46. Insider trading was first captured under § 10(b) in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,
73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). In Speed v. Transamerica Corp., the disctrict court stated:
The rule is clear. It is unlawful for an insider, such as a majority stockholder, to
purchase the stock of minority stockholders without disclosing material facts affect-
ing the value of the stock, known to the majority stockholder by virtue of his inside
position but not known to the selling minority stockholders, which information
would have affected the judgment of the sellers. The duty of disclosure stems from
the necessity of preventing a corporate insider from utilizing his position to take
unfair advantage of the uninformed minority stockholders. It is an attempt to pro-
vide some degree of equalization of bargaining position in order that the minority
may exercise an informed judgment in any such transaction.
99 F. Supp. 808, 848 (D. Del. 1951).
47. The early cases applying rule 1Ob-5 involved instances of "direct transactions", where
a corporation or its officers transacted with others without disclosing material information.
See, e.g., Speed, 99 F. Supp. at 812; Kardon, 73 F. Supp. at 800-01. Beginning in 1961 the SEC
successfully extended the rule beyond face-to-face transactions to the trading on inside infor-
mation in anonymous stock exchange transactions. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C.
907 (1961).
48. See Brudney, supra note 16.
49. The "disclose or abtain" doctrine was first formally announced in SEC v. Texas Gulf
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violates the disclosure doctrine and triggers the available sanctions.
The most widely used enforcement tool in insider trading cases has been
section 21(d) of the 1934 Act, which provides the SEC with authority to
bring suit in federal courts to enjoin violations of the securities laws.5"
Under this section, the SEC may seek injunctive relief "[w]herever it shall
appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or about to engage in
acts or practices constituting a violation" of securities laws or regulations. 5
In turn, federal courts may grant a temporary or permanent injunction or
restraining order upon a "proper showing" of a reasonable likelihood of fu-
ture violations.5 2 However, injunctions and restraining orders only help to
prevent future violations and do not correct the pecuniary consequences of
insider trading. To make insider trading unprofitable in SEC enforcement
actions, courts have developed the disgorgement remedy, an implied en-
forcement measure not provided by the federal securities laws.
5 3
The issue of the proper measurement of insider liability under rule lOb-5
has been confused. The early rule lOb-5 insider trading cases involved de-
fendants who traded directly with the parties they defrauded. 54 Because the
parties were in privity, courts applied remedies ranging from rescission5 5 to
monetary restitution56 to damages.5 7 In the case of "market" transactions,
however, none of these remedies may be appropriate as there is generally no
Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). See also
Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1977). In Fridrich, the court noted that the duty
to disclose material information is not absolute. The insider may either disclose or refrain
from trading, and it is the act of trading that violates rule lOb-5. Id. at 324-25.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1982).
51. Id.
52. A "proper showing" requires proof of a past violation and a reasonable likelihood of
future violations. SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241, 249-50 (2d Cir. 1959).
53. In Golconda Mining, the court stated: "The injunction against future violations, while
of some deterrent force, is only a partial remedy since it does not correct the consequences of
past conduct." 327 F. Supp. at 259. See also MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 52-55; Commonwealth
Chemical, 574 F.2d at 102-03; Shapiro, 494 F.2d at 1309.
54. See supra note 47.
55. Rescission, also called equitable replevin, repudiates the sale of the stock and the par-
ties are returned to the status quo. In other words, the defrauded seller regains the stock and
the consideration paid is returned to the buyer. Many of the reported cases are not formally
denominated rescission. See Crist v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 343 F.2d 902 (10th Cir.
1965); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965); Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith,
312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962). Obviously, where the defendant has sold the stock prior to the
judgment, this remedy cannot be applied.
56. This remedy has been referred to as rescissional or restitutional damages. See Myzel
v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 741-43 (8th Cir. 1967). In Myzel, the Eighth Circuit stated that where
it is impossible to return the parties to the status quo, then the "equivalent value of the stock at
the time of resale or at the time of judgment should be the proper measure of damage." Id. at
742 (footnotes omitted). The court further noted that where there is no longer an existing
market value for the stock and there clearly has been a fluctuation in value since the fraudulent
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single investor or class of investors who can be identified as having been
damaged by the insider's fraud.58 Rather, this form of insider trading leaves
little chance of detection and defrauds the entire marketplace by subverting
its integrity. 9 Thus, disgorgement evolved as a way to redress the public
investment community by removing all profit from the defendant without
the limitations applied in traditional private restitutional decrees.' The dis-
gorgement remedy, having been the subject of judicial disagreement, has not
resolved the issue of the proper measure of insider liability in SEC insider
trading actions. 6 ' Nonetheless, in applying disgorgement, courts have estab-
lished certain principles from which inferences may be drawn as to what
sale, "then what restitutional damages are to be awarded must depend upon the facts of the
particular case." Id. at 743.
57. Two types of damages can be awarded: (1) compensation for loss of anticipated prof-
its, sometimes called "bargain damages" or "benefit of bargain damages," or (2) compensation
for losses actually incurred, usually referred to as "out of pocket" losses. Under bargain dam-
ages, the plaintiff may recover when the property is not as it was represented to be, irrespective
of whether it was worth more or less than its price. See Corder v. Laws, 148 Colo. 310, 366
P.2d 369 (1961). Out of pocket losses, however, entitle the plaintiff only to the consideration
given that is greater than the actual value received. Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328 (2d
Cir. 1971). Thus, if the securities were worth what the plaintiff paid there can be no recovery,
regardless of what representations were made.
58. See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 915 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969). See also
Fridrich, where the court noted that:
Since there is no practical method for matching purchases and sales in the open
market, requiring privity in the common law sense as an element of rule lob-5 would
create an insurmountable obstacle for plaintiffs. Reliance also has little relevance to
trading in the open market where there are no face-to-face negotiations as a rule, and
where non-disclosure of a material fact is often the gravamen of the complaint.
542 F.2d at 325.
59. See, e.g., Certain Unknown Purchasers, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 98,323 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The insider trading problem has become more
widespread in recent years with the increase in mergers and tender offers, which often result in
immediate and dramatic price movements in the stock of a target company. See. e.g., SEC v.
Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,346
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (overnight profit of nearly $2 million where securities were purchased one day
before announcement of tender offer). Additional incentive for insider trading has been pro-
vided by the growth of the options market (the purchase of the option to buy shares at a fixed
price anytime before expiration of the option contract) where a small investment in options can
yield proportionally enormous profits if the underlying stock increases in value.
60. Cheney and Sibears note the sharp distinction between SEC actions for disgorgement
and private suits because, unlike a private plaintiff, the Commission acts as a representative of
the public interest seeking "to redress a wrong that has harmed the entire marketplace. Abu-
sive trading has the potential to visit damage beyond the persons involved in specific trades in
that it undermines investor confidence in the integrity and fairness of the public securities
markets." Cheney & Sibears, supra note 2, at 7.
61. Id. "[A] lack of clarity as to the proper measure of the amount to be disgorged has
arisen from the failure of courts to fully appreciate the distinction between a commission and a
private action and consequently to articulate a rationale for disgorgement independent of pri-
vate theories." Id.
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should be the proper measure of insider liability in these public law enforce-
ment actions.
II. ALTERNATIVE THEORIES FOR MEASURING DISGORGEMENT IN
RULE lOb-5 INSIDER TRADING CASES
A. Janigan v. Taylor: First Circuit Lays the Foundation for Measuring
Disgorgement in Rule 10b-5 Insider Trading Actions
Janigan v. Taylor, 6 a private action, was the first case in which a federal
circuit court directly addressed the issue of measuring disgorgement in a rule
lOb-5 insider trading suit.63 In Janigan, the plaintiffs, some of whom were
former shareholders of Boston Steel Casting, Inc. (BESCO), successfully
contended that BESCO's president had induced them to sell virtually all of
the company's stock by withholding material inside information.' The dis-
trict court found that the defendant had withheld knowledge of spawning
business developments at the time of his stock purchases.65 Based on the
undisclosed information, the defendant purchased the BESCO securities for
approximately $40,000 and sold them two years later for over $700,000.66
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district
court's order requiring the defendant to disgorge his entire profit from the
purchase and sale, reasoning that simple equity requires wrongdoers to re-
store all benefits unlawfully obtained.67 Thus, Janigan encunciated the
proposition that doubts are to be resolved against the inside trader where the
nature of the securities fraud makes the amount of unjust enrichment
uncertain.
68
The significance of Janigan rests in the court's finding that the proper
62. 344 F.2d 781 (1st. Cir), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
63. See MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 53. The majority noted that analyzing the measure of
disgorgement requires the court "to start at the beginning, in our earlier case of Janigan v.
Taylor. ... Id.
64. Taylor v. Janigan, 212 F. Supp. 794 (D. Mass. 1962). Specifically, the defendant was
found to have withheld knowledge of the firming of prices and the increased backing of unfilled
orders at a special shareholders meeting. The district court found these ommissions to be
material and concluded that they would have affected BESCO shareholders' decisions to sell
their stock to the defendant. Id. at 799-800.
65. Id. at 799.
66. Id. at 798.
67. Janigan, 344 F.2d at 786.
68. For other support of this principle, see Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S.
251, 265 (1946) (the most elementary conceptions of justice and public policy require that the
wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty which his own wrong has created). Accord E.
GADSBY, supra note 1. Cf Blatt, 583 F.2d at 1335; Blau, 286 F.2d at 791; Adler, 267 F.2d at




measure of disgorgement should be the inside trader's entire profit, as op-
posed to limiting liability to the defrauded parties' actual or forseeable loss.69
The court reasoned that this application of the disgorgement remedy was
consistent with the definitional purpose of disgorgement, as well as other
equitable concepts inherent in this form of relief.7" Speaking for the panel,
Chief Judge Aldrich stated in a near-famous quote: "It is more appropriate
to give the plaintiff the benefit of windfalls [speculative gains] than to let the
fraudulent party keep them.""1 Hence, the Janigan court required complete
disgorgement of insider profits regardless of whether all profits were attribu-
table to the inside information upon which the defendant traded.72
Janigan, however, must be distinguished from the typical insider trading
case for two principal reasons. First, the defendant purchased virtually all of
BESCO's stock and, thus, the plaintiffs could not have mitigated their losses
by reinvesting in the securities.73 Second, there was no public disclosure of
the inside information that had been withheld from the plaintiffs. 74 Thus,
there was no date at which the defendant and plaintiffs possessed equivalent
material information, thereby precluding application of any equal footing
concept.75 Moreover, the fraud was not conducted impersonally over an ex-
change, but rather, it was perpetrated at a Board of Directors meeting at
69. See Janigan, 344 F.2d at 786. Cf Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128, 155 (damages are the defendant's entire profit where defendant received more than seller's
actual loss). Accord Rochez v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
993 (1976). In Rochez, the defendant purchased a co-owner's 50% interest in a business while
withholding material information. Citing Janigan and Affiliated Ute, the court ordered full
disgorgement, stating that the defrauded seller of securities is entitled to the greater of either
"the difference between the sale price of stock in the fraudulant transaction and its fair market
value at that time or the fraudulent buyer's profit on resale." Id. at 417.
70. Janigan, 344 F.2d at 786.
71. Id. at 786; see also Cheney & Sibears, supra note 2, at 11 ("This statement arguably
lends support to disgorgement measured by the entire profit realized by one trading on inside
information.")
72. Janigan, 344 F.2d at 786. The First Circuit did note, however, that the full disgorge-
ment principle would be limited if the inside trader had increased the value of the company's
securities by "personal efforts" unrelated to the fraud. Id. at 787. The court illustrated this
limitation by presenting a hypothetical where an artist acquires paints by fraud and uses them
to produce a valuable portrait. In such a case, the defrauded party would not be entitled to
either the portrait or to the proceeds of its sale. Id.
73. See MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 53; Cheney & Sibears, supra note 2, at 11-12.
74. See supra note 73.
75. The nature and extent of the fraud was not revealed until two years after the BESCO
securities were sold to the defendant. At that time, the defendant contacted an attorney who
was a member of BESCO's Board of Directors, informing him of the plan to sell BESCO for
$700,000 and requesting his aid as counsel. The attorney declined and requested and received
permission to examine BECSO's records. Following the examination, a complaint was filed
charging the defendant with willful violation of rule lOb-5. Taylor v. Janigan, 212 F. Supp. at
798-99.
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which the defendant made material misrepresentations directly to other
members of the Board in order to induce them to sell their shares.76 All
director-shareholders agreed to the defendant's tender offer and recom-
mended acceptance of the defendant's offer to other shareholders.77 As a
result, by utilizing inside information gained through his position as
BESCO's president, the defendant actually effectuated the purchase of an
entire business by virtue of rule l0b-5 insider trading.78
Nevertheless, Janigan established full disgorgement as the proper focus of
insider liability in rule lOb-5 actions. Yet, because Janigan was founded
upon an atypical fact pattern, it could not stand as clear precedent for the
full disgorgement measure of insider liability. Instead, other circuit courts
adopted a standard termed "equal footing", a measure of insider trading
liability that requires only partial disgorgement of profits resulting from in-
sider trading.
B. Origins of the Equal Footing Principle Under Rule lOb-5: The Texas
Gulf Sulphur Cases
The first step taken by federal circuit courts in the development of the
disgorgement remedy in rule lOb-5 insider trading actions involving "market
transactions" is rooted in two cases stemming from the infamous Texas Gulf
Sulphur calamity of 1964.79 On April 11, 1964 the Herald Tribune and the
New York Times both carried stories of a rumored mineral strike by the
Texas Gulf Sulphur Company (TGS).s° The next day, the company's presi-
dent issued a press release substantially denying the rumored ore strike or
any other unusual degree of success in the company's drilling projects.8"
The statement was, in fact, highly misleading and many investors sold TGS
stock based on this false report.82 Four days later, the company released a
corrective report indicating that TGS had indeed uncovered a potential bo-
76. Id. at 795-98.
77. Id. at 798.
78. Id. Some courts have held that where a purchase of an entire business is effectuated
by way of purchasing all of the business' outstanding securities, such a transaction is "commer-
cial" rather than "investment" in nature, and therefore, does not involve the sale of "securi-
ties" within the meaning of the securities acts. Thus, the sale is not protected by the antifraud
provisions of the Acts. See e.g., Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 1017 (1981); see generally Seldin, When Stock is Not a Security: The "Sale of Busi-
ness" Doctrine Under the Federal Securities Laws, 37 Bus. L. 637 (1982).
79. See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied., 404
U.S. 1004 (1971); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2nd Cir.), cert denied, 404
U.S. 1005 (1971).
80. Mitchell, 446 F.2d at 94.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 97, 102-03.
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nanza in copper, zinc, and silver in the Timmins area of Ontario, Canada.
Consequently, investors who had sold their TGS stock based on the initial
misleading press release brought suit for damages.83
One case resulting from these events was Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Company.84 In Mitchell, a consolidated civil action brought under rule lOb-
5, the plaintiffs alleged that the deceptive public statement caused them to
sell TGS stock prior to its dramatic rise in market value following the cura-
tive release.85 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
held, inter alia, that the defrauded parties were entitled to recover only those
profits that could have been realized as of the date that they reasonably
should have been aware of the corrective press release. 86 The court reasoned
that after the curative release all parties stood equally apprised of the mate-
rial facts concerning the market value of TGS stock, and the deceived sellers
could have taken the remedial action of reinvesting in the stock.87
Thus, Mitchell stands for the proposition that plaintiffs should not be enti-
tled to profits accrued after the date that knowledge of the material informa-
tion is imputed to them.88 By holding that the wrongdoers' liability was cut
off by the availability of all material information concerning the security at
issue, the Tenth Circuit implicitly advanced the equal footing concept of
partial disgorgement.8 9 Mitchell, however, for a number of reasons, should
not be interpreted as controlling precedent for measuring disgorgement in
SEC rule lOb-5 insider trading actions.
First, Mitchell was not an insider trading action.9" The court was not
reproaching the trading of securities on the basis of inside information. 9
83. Id. at 95. On April 12, the day TGS officially denied the rumored ore strike, its stock
closed at $30 7/ per share. Following the curative press release on April 16 the stock jumped
to $37 per share and closed at $36 3/A on that day. Approximately one month later TGS stock
was priced at $58 . Thus, shareholders who sold because of the April 12 press release lost a
minimum of $5 per share provided they reinvested immediately after the April 16 release.
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 847 (2nd Cir. 1968).
84. 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
85. Mitchell was the culmination of four cases originally consolidated in Reynolds v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 548 (D. Utah 1970).
86. Mitchell, 446 F.2d at 105.
87. Id. at 105-06.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 106. The court desribed its remedy as a compromise "between the restitution
rule and the actual damage approach." Id.
90. Id. at 100 n. 10. The court noted: "Although considerable trading had been done by
corporate 'insiders' and 'tippees,' it was stipulated at trial that there was no illegal trading by
the instant parties at or after the time of the [misleading] April 12 press release." Id.
91. Id. In Mitchell the court's duty was to ascertain whether the release was materially
deceptive within the meaning of the securities laws, and to assess the liability that should be
attached to the release. Id. at 97-107. It should be noted that courts will sometimes find
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Rather, the court reproved defendants who had issued a false and misleading
statement resulting in losses to investors who sold their stock based on that
public release.92 Thus, liability was not assessed in order to restore illicit
profits derived through the use of nonpublic information, but to impose
sanctions for the dissemination of false and misleading information. There-
fore, although Mitchell utilized the equal footing concept, the holding did
not allow any defendant to retain the fruits of a securities fraud because the
wrongdoing at issue did not produce illicit profits.
Additionally, Mitchell was a private action, not a public law enforcement
action. Certainly, different values are at stake when actions are brought by
the SEC on behalf of public equity.93 Moreover, the court did not refer to its
remedy as disgorgement, and arguably, the case has little precedential value
for measuring disgorgement when a court specifically applies that remedy.
Indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit clearly
indicated that its holding should not be interpreted as controlling precedent
for measuring liability in rule lob-5 actions, specifically stating that "because
of the uniqueness of the litigation, it would be unwise to set forth a uniform
rule with broad applications to all securities cases."94
Although Mitchell was not an insider trading suit, in a case based on the
same fact pattern as Mitchell, the SEC successfully compelled disgorgement
of insider profits made by certain officers, directors, and employees of
TGS.9 5 In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,96 the Commission persuasively ar-
gued that the defendants traded TGS stock based on the same misleading
press release at issue in Mitchell and that the SEC had the requisite power to
seek disgorgement of profits resulting from their trading. However, the Sec-
ond Circuit restricted liability to those profits accruing up to the time of
omissions not materially false or misleading because the omissions at issue are speculative in
nature. See, e.g., Sundray Dx Oil Co. v. Helmerich and Payne, Inc., 398 F.2d 447 (10th Cir.
1968) (proxy statement omitting that developer of adjacent lease had announced a major oil
discovery held not to be false or misleading because the average investor cannot distinguish
between "probable" and "proved" oil reserves; therefore, only omissions of proved oil reserves
would be materially misleading).
92. An action for disgorgement of profits made by corporate insiders trading in violation
rule lOb-5 culminated in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301. See infra notes 95-
108 and accompanying text.
93. See MacDonald, 699 F.2d 55-58 (Coffin, C.S. & Browner, J., dissenting); Common-
wealth Chemical, 574 F.2d at 95; Manor Nursing, 458 F.2d at 1104; Petrofunds, 420 F. Supp.
at 960; Golconda Mining, 327 F. Supp. at 258-59; see also, Cheney & Sibears, supra note 2, at
7-8.
94. Mitchell, 446 F.2d at 105.
95. 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971). This was the first federal





public disclosure of the mineral strike. 97 The court rationalized its measure
of insider trading liability by noting that it served to deprive the violators of
gains accruing before the mineral strike became "general knowledge."98 In
other words, dissemination of the previously nonpublic information ended
the causal relation between the fraud and post-disclosure profits. 99 Effec-
tively, this measure of damages attempted to correct the wrongdoing by
moving the dates of the illicit stock purchases up to the day following the
curative press release. " On that date, damages ceased to be attributable to
insider trading apparently because the defendants no longer held TGS stock
based on inside information.° 1
In discussing the insiders' liability, the court referred to the equitable re-
lief it rendered as "restitution of profits" and consistently applied the princi-
ples of restitution in fashioning its remedy.'o 2 As in Mitchell, nowhere in
the opinion does the court state that it is fashioning a remedy premised upon
the concept of disgorgement. Thus, because the Second Circuit was apply-
ing a different remedy, arguably similar to the Tenth Circuit holding in
Mitchell, this case has only tenuous precedential value for federal courts now
struggling with the measure of disgorgement in SEC insider trading ac-
tions.10 3 Furthermore, in assessing its precedential value, it is noteworthy
that the starting point of the liability analysis was not the defendants' entire
profit, which had been established by Janigan as the focus of the disgorge-
97. Id. at 1307-08.
98. The Second Circuit stated:
Restitution of the profits on these transactions merely deprives the appellants of the
gains of their wrongful conduct. Nor does restitution impose a harship in this
case. . . . The court's order requires only restitution of the profits made by the
violators prior to general knowledge of the ore strike on April 17, 1964, and, in effect,
leaves the appellant all the profits accrued after that date. It would severely defeat
the purposes of the Act if the violator of Rule lOb-5 were allowed to retain the profits
from his violation. The district court's order corrects this by effectively moving the
purchase dates of the violators' purchases up to April 17, 1964.
Id. at 1308.
99. Id.
100. Id. Judge Friendly outlined the rationale underlying this theory of relief in a private
action. In Gerstle Y. Gamble-Skogmo, Judge Friendly wrote:
The reason for this, in the case of marketable securities, is obvious. Once the seller
has discovered the fraud, he can protect against further damage by replacing the
securities and should not be allowed to profit from a further appreciation, while being
protected against depreciation by his right to recover at least the difference in value
at the time of his sale.
478 F.2d 1281, 1306 n.27 (2d Cir. 1973).
101. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d at 1308. But see Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 156
(all investors are not equally informed); cf Mitchell, 446 F.2d at 105 (equal footing concept
applied to plaintiffs possessing "ample sophistication").
102. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d at 1307-09.
103. See Mitchell, 446 F.2d at 105-06.
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ment remedy. 1°4
While noting that the SEC was not restricted to injunctive relief,1"5 the
court nonetheless fashioned a remedy that did not depart from the tradi-
tional restitutional concepts utilized in private actions.' 0 6 The court limited
liability to those profits accrued as of the date on which a reasonable investor
should have known of the mineral strike.'0 7 In shaping the remedy, the
court did not discuss whether the SEC's presence as plaintiff should create
special considerations or whether liability should be equivalent to that to
which a private party would have been entitled under the same
circumstances. 108
At the time of the the Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation, however, the power
of the Commission to seek equitable relief in the form of monetary damages
was still a novel issue.109 Insider liability was but one of many issues inter-
twined in the complex TGS litigation, and the court could not have fully
explored the distinctions between SEC actions and private suits. Neverthe-
less, the Second Circuit's holding in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur was the first
time a federal circuit court utilized the concept of "equal footing" in an SEC
insider trading action, thereby permitting inside traders to retain a portion of
the profits derived from trading on the basis of nonpublic information.
104. See supra notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
105. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d at 1307.
106. Id. at 1307-08. The court did enter a somewhat novel decree by ordering one defend-
ant to restore profits made by "tippees" who were not involved in the proceeding despite there
being no evidence that the defendant himself actually profited. Finding that this did not con-
stitute an "unjust penalty," the court noted that this portion of the remedy was necessary to
deter insider trading that could be conducted through "implied understandings" and "recipro-
cal tips." Id. at 1308.
107. Id. at 1308.
108. Cf supra notes 19, 32-33, 60-61, and accompanying text. It must be noted, however,
that TGS was already under intense litigious assault from private plaintiffs. The trial court
noted that 49 private actions, comprising at least 475 plaintiffs, were pending against TGS.
Even though many of the complaints did not specify the damages sought, those already alleged
were in excess of $80 million. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 258 F. Supp. 262, 267 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. 1966). Thus, application of basic restitutional principles was necessary to avoid
what would otherwise be virtually 'unlimited liability if every party were granted the relief they
sought.
109. See supra note 18. For further discussions of the impact and implications of the Texas
Gulf Sulphur litigation, see Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices:
The Implication of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceedings, 51 VA. L. REV. 127 (1965); Ruder,
Corporate Disclosures Required By The Federal Securities Laws: The Codificaton Implications
Of Texas Gulf Sulphur, 61 NW. U.L. REV. 872 (1967); Note, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.:
The Inside And Outside Of Rule lOb-5, 46 B.U.L. REV. 205 (1966); Note, Texas Gulf Sulphur
And The Duty Of Disclosure, Another View, 55 GEO. L. REV. 664 (1967).
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C. The Second Circuit Further Develops The Equal Footing Concept
Since the seminal decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, in which the
Commission first successfully obtained money damages, the Second Circuit
has used the equal footing concept in three major SEC actions."1 ° In each
instance, however, application of this principle did not allow the defendants
to retain any portion of profits derived from securities fraud. SEC v. Manor
Nursing Centers 111 was the first federal circuit case following SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur in which the Second Circuit applied equal footing in the con-
text of a Commission suit. Like Mitchell, Manor Nursing did not involve
insider trading.
In Manor Nursing, the SEC charged the defendants with violating an-
tifraud provisions and prospectus delivery requirements of the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.112 The defendants had
engaged in a public offering of stock and induced investors to part with
funds by promising that the invested monies would be placed in escrow and
returned to them if all shares of the stock were not sold by a certain date.113
In contravention of the agreement, the defendants retained the funds for
personal use.114 The United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York ordered the defendants to disgorge all proceeds, profits, and
income garnered by virtue of the public offering.115
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
district court's judgment in all respects except to the extent that the lower
court had ordered disgorgement of income earned by the defendants as a
result of investing the fraudulently obtained proceeds.116 Implicitly apply-
ing the notion of equal footing, the court reversed that portion of the judg-
ment, finding that disgorgement of profits earned after the fraud had been
completed constituted an unjust penalty exceeding the "remedial" purposes
of federal securities laws.' 17 This was so, the court reasoned, because order-
110. See SEC v. Commonwealth Chemical Securities, Inc., 574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978);
SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d
1082 (2d Cir. 1972).
111. 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972).
112. The defendants violated antifraud provisions § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q(a) (1982); § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1982); and rule lOb-5 promulgated
thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. Additionally, the defendants violated the prospectus deliv-
ery provision in § 5(b)(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1982).
113. Manor Nursing, 458 F.2d at 1092-93.
114. Id.
115. SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers Inc., 340 F. Supp. 913, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
116. Manor Nursing, 458 F.2d at 1104-05.
117. Id. Prior to the enactment of The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, it was well-
established that courts were confined to remedial relief when fashioning remedies for securities
law violations and, therefore, could not make penalty assessments. See infra notes 176-87 and
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ing such post-fraud disgorgement would require defendants who invested the
fraudulent proceeds wisely to disgorge substantially more than other
defendants. 118
However, the court stated that full disgorgement could be justified if its
deterrent impact is necessary to effectuate enforcement of securities laws.119
Yet, the court found that under the facts of the case, injunctive relief, cou-
pled with the restoration of proceeds received in connection with the fraudu-
lent stock offering plus interest, was sufficient remedial redress. 120
Although Manor Nursing did not involve disgorgement in the context of
insider trading, the case is a significant contribution to the development of
the disgorgement remedy. By reversing a full disgorgement order that had
included "secondary profits," the Second Circuit implicitly applied a form of
equal footing because the court used a causation analysis in limiting liabil-
ity. "' However, by noting that full disgorgement could be justified if its
deterrent impact were essential to the effective enforcement of the federal
securities laws, the court advanced the concept of deterrence as a factor in
assessing liability. 22 Indeed, the court stated, "The deterrent effect of an
SEC enforcement action would be greatly undermined if securities law viola-
tors were not required to disgorge illicit profits" and that "effective enforce-
ment of the federal securities laws requires that the SEC be able to make
violations unprofitable.
'"1 23
In the next major disgorgement case, SEC v. Shapiro,24 the Second Cir-
accompanying text. See Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 195 (noting that securities laws were en-
acted for the purpose of avoiding fraud and are to be construed flexibly to effectuate their
underlying remedial purposes); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d at 1310 (SEC may seek
other than injunctive relief "so long as such relief is remedial relief and is not a penalty assess-
ment"); cf Beck v. SEC, 430 F.2d 673 (6th Cir 1970) (suspension of broker's license held to be
an unjust penalty where broker was inexperienced in the securities business and under the
supervision of men who where later adjudged guilty of criminal fraud).
118. Manor Nursing, 458 F.2d at 1104-05.
119. Id. at 1104.
120. Id. The Second Circuit used a balancing test. The potential deterrent effect of full
disgorgement was weighed against "requiring those appellants who invested wisely to refund
substantially more than other appellants." Id. at 1104-05. Seemingly, this could be inter-
preted as an application of the disgorgement limitation noted in Janigan where the court stated
that a defendant should not be required to disgorge profits derived from "personal efforts"
unrelated to an act of wrongdoing. See supra note 72.
121. Manor Nursing, 458 F.2d at 1104
122. Id. Accord Golconda Mining, 327 F. Supp. at 259. See supra note 11.
123. Manor Nursing, 458 F.2d at 1104. For in-depth discussions of the Manor Nursing
case, see Note, Truth Up to the Date of Use as a Requirement for Section 10(a) Prospectus: The
Implications ofSEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 24 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 771 (1973);
Note, Prospectus Liability for Failure to Disclose Post-Effective Developments: A New Duty and
its Implications, 48 IND. L.J. 464 (1972).
124. 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974).
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cuit applied the equal footing principle to an inside trader. Shapiro was the
first case in which a federal circuit court specifically applied both the dis-
gorgement remedy and the equal footing principle to an inside trader.
In Shapiro, after having traded on the basis of nonpublic information, the
defendant retained a portion of the illegally purchased securities after the
dissemination of the nonpublic information upon which he traded.125 The
defendant's decision proved unwise, however, as merger negotiations, which
constituted the inside information, fell through, and the stock's market value
fell.' 2 6 The defendant contended that subsequent losses wiped out prior
gains and because no unjust enrichment was retained, disgorgement was not
an appropriate remedy.
The Shapiro court, however, uniquely applied equal footing by ordering
the defendant to disgorge "paper profits," money he could have realized had
he sold the stock at the time the nonpublic information upon which he
traded became generally disseminated.' 27 The court reasoned that the de-
fendant should be liable for the lost investment opportunity created by the
fraudulent purchase and retention of the securities during the nondisclosure
period.' 28 Thereafter, he held the securities at his own risk and the fact that
his decision proved imprudent, the court reasoned, did not negate the liabil-
ity that had already accrued. 2 9
Thus, Shapiro, like Manor Nursing, furthered the role of deterrence in
measuring disgorgement, because the court required restoration of profits
never realized by the inside trader.' 3° Circuit Judge Hays noted that a con-
125. Shapiro, 494 F.2d at 1304-05.
126. Id. Shapiro was a partner in a firm that specialized in arranging corporate mergers
and acquisitions. While engaged in merger negotiations between Ridge Manor Development
Corp. and Harvey's Stores, Inc., Shapiro's partner purchased and sold stocks and options of
Harvey's, then a publicly traded stock on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX). The de-
fendants unsuccessfully contended that they did not trade based on "material" information
because they believed the possibility of a merger was remote and because they were routinely
engaged in such negotiations. The court concluded that the merger negotiations were material
because a "reasonable investor might have considered them important in the making of [an
investment] decision." Id. at 1305 (citing Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 154); see also Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 390 U.S. 375, 385 (1970) (test of materiality is one of balancing the
indicated probability of the event or consequence against its magnitude upon occurrence).
127. Shapiro, 494 F.2d at 1309. In responding to the defendant's contention that disgorge-
ment of profits never realized constituted an unjust penalty, the court found that the losses
suffered by the defendant were the result of an unwise investment decision to keep the stock
after the previously nonpublic information was disclosed. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. Accord Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251 (1946); SEC v. Common-
wealth Chemical Sec. Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1978).
130. See Cheney & Sibears, supra note 2 ("[T]he Shapiro court continued to apply the
rationale . . . explicit in Manor Nursing Centers that deterrence is a justification for fashioning
an order of disgorgement most likely to prevent further violative conduct."). Id. at 8.
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trary holding would create a "serious anomaly" that could encourage insider
trading.13 ' That is, ordering disgorgement only of profits realized would
create a "heads-I-win-tails-you-lose opportunity for the violator" because
the inside trader would be allowed to keep subsequent profits but not be
required to disgorge subsequent losses.' 32 Such an outcome would under-
mine the deterrent effect of rule lOb-5 because the violator would never
stand to lose more than might be gained by retention of the tainted securi-
ties. 1 33 Obviously, because the Shapiro application of equal footing requires
disgorgement of any form of unjust enrichment, the Shapiro remedy differs
significantly from cases like MacDonald where the decision to retain the se-
curities produces windfall profits.' 34
In SEC v. Commonwealth Chemical Securities135 the Second Circuit again
applied the equal footing principle so as to effectuate deterrence by ordering
disgorgement of money never realized. The defendants in Commonwealth
Chemical, some of whom were distributors of an original offering of securi-
ties, engaged in a successful scheme designed to drive the market value of
those securities upward.' 36 This was done by embarking on a campaign of
buying and selling the securities in large transactions causing the stock price
to rise astronomically during a period when no earnings were reported. 137
The SEC uncovered the scheme and suspended trading in the stock, thus
precluding the defendants from selling their shares for approximately eight
months.' 3 8 After the SEC lifted the suspension, the stock's value tumbled
131. Shapiro, 494 F.2d at 1309.
132. Id. Cf Ellsworth, supra note 2, at 656 (noting that the court's "coin-toss" characteri-
zation suggests that the Second Circuit was not abandoning the position it maintained in
Manor Nursing, where it held that wrongdoers who profitably invest ill-gotten gains must not
be required to disgorge such secondary profits). Shapiro, however, did not involve the issue of
whether the violator should be allowed to keep actual profits resulting from the securities
fraud. See MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 56 (Coffin, C.J. & Bownes, J., dissenting) ("As for Shapiro,
ignoring losses after disclosure of the inside information does not require that gains after dis-
closure also be ignored.").
133. See MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 56; Shapiro, 494 F.2d at 1309; see also SEC v. R.J. Allen
Assoc., 386 F. Supp. 866, 881 (S.D. Fla. 1974) ("The deterrent effect of Commission enforce-
ment actions would be greatly undermined if securities law violators were not required to
disgorge illicit gains.").
134. See, e.g., SEC v. MacDonald, 568 F. Supp, 111, 114 (D.R.I. 1983). In applying the
equal footing principle on remand, the district court's remedy allowed the defendant to retain
nearly $40,000 and disgorge only about $18,000 of the profits accrued on securities bought on
inside information.
135. 574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978).
136. Id. at 92-94.
137. Id. The Commission's principal evidence was an SEC analyst who testified that the
defendants had participated in an "extraordinarily large percentage of all transactions." Id. at
93.
138. Id. at 102.
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and the defendants sold at a net loss.' 39
Notwithstanding that the defendants did not profit from their hoax, the
Second Circuit again ordered disgorgement of all "paper profits" that would
have been realized had they sold prior to the suspension of trading. II Writ-
ing for the bench, Judge Friendly reasoned that "the court must [not] give
[the defendants] credit for the fact that they had not succeeded in unloading
all their purchases at the time when the scheme collapsed."'
' 41
Although Commonwealth Chemical was not an insider trading case, the
court's specific usage of the disgorgement remedy under these facts provides
guidance for fashioning the remedy in SEC insider trading actions. As in
Shapiro, the Second Circuit applied the equal footing concept so as to effec-
tuate deterrence by removing all unjust enrichment from the wrongdoers,
including profits never realized. The court noted that unlike damages,
which serve primarily to compensate investors, the disgorgement remedy is
applied in order to divest the wrongdoer of any form of wrongful profit. 142
The court further noted that in exercising its discretion to prevent unjust
enrichment, it is immaterial to the measure of disgorgement where the profit
came from, or to whom it will be restored. 143
In Manor Nursing, Shapiro, and Commonwealth Chemical the Second Cir-
cuit advanced the deterrence concept that the disgorgement remedy is
designed to effectuate. All three cases imputed the notion of equal footing
into the measure of disgorgement; yet, each decision removed all profit re-
sulting from the securities violations. In both Shapiro and Commonwealth
Chemical, application of the equal footing principle actually caused the de-
fendants to lose money as a result of their wrongdoing because they were
forced to disgorge "paper profits," monies never realized. Clearly, the eco-
nomic outcome in such cases makes them unpersuasive precedent for appli-
cation of equal footing when the inside trader gains windfall profits by
retaining securities beyond the equal footing date and application of the
principle would allow the wrongdoer to keep fruits of misconduct.'
44
139. Id.
140. Id. The court gave no weight to the defendants' contention that because they still held
substantial amounts of securities at the time of suspension, "that losses after trading resumed
wiped out any profits." Id. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 213 (1959) (trustees
who breach fiduciary duty may not balance losses incurred in such breaches against gains in
order to reduce personal liability).
141. Commonwealth Chemical, 574 F.2d at 102.
142. Id. at 95.
143. Id. Accord Blatt, 583 F.2d at 1325; Janigan, 344 F.2d at 781; Penn Central, 425 F.
Supp. at 593; Golconda Mining, 327 F. Supp. at 257; E. GADSBY, supra note 1.
144. The MacDonald court noted:
As for Shapiro, ignoring losses after disclosure of the inside information does not
require that gains after disclosure also be ignored. To the extent [Manor Nursing] is
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The Second Circuit's application of equal footing in Shapiro and Com-
monwealth Chemical served as a way to measure the adverse financial conse-
quences the defendants would have to bear because in both cases the stock
value fell after the equal footing period. In Manor Nursing, equal footing
meant simply that the court refrained from applying disgorgement to income
earned on the defendants' wrongful profits because under the facts, such an
order would constitute an unjust and inconsistent penalty depending on the
post-fraud activities of the individual defendants. Manor Nursing clearly es-
poused the view that deterrence alone could be sufficient justification for full
disgorgement, even though under the facts of the case that court applied
only partial disgorgement. 145 All three cases specifically used the disgorge-
ment remedy and each stands for the proposition that the measure of dis-
gorgement should be shaped in a manner that effectuates deterrence and
removes all profits derived from a securities fraud.146 Individually, none of
these cases supports the notion that equal footing should be applied in a
context where it would permit the retention of profits directly resulting from
a securities fraud. In SEC v. MacDonald, however, the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit, under a holding premised on the equal foot-
ing concept, applied "disgorgement" so as to permit an inside trader to re-
tain windfall profits that accrued after the equal footing period.
III. THE MACDONALD CASE: CONFLICTING APPROACHES TO
MEASURING DISGORGEMENT IN SEC PUBLIC LAW
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
A. The Majority Applies Equal Footing
Continuing its effort to promote fairness within the securities industry, the
SEC brought suit against James MacDonald, charging him with violating
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule lOb-5 promul-
gated thereunder. 4 7 MacDonald had purchased 9,500 shares of the publicly
traded stock of Realty Investment Trust (RIT), a corporation in which he
served as Chairman of the Board of Trustees. The Commission successfully
persuasive ... it supports full disgorgement here, for it is premised on a measure of
disgorgement adequate to provide 'sufficient deterrence to future violations.'
699 F.2d at 56-57 (Coffin, C.J. & Bownes, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
145. Manor Nursing, 458 F.2d at 1104.
146. See Commonwealth Chemical, 574 F.2d at 102 ("[Disgorgmement] is a method of
forcing a defendant to give up the amount by which he was unjustly enriched."); Shapiro, 494
F.2d at 1309 ("A violator of the securities laws should disgorge profits earned by trading on
nonpublic information."); Manor Nursing, 458 F.2d at 1104; see also Cheney & Sibears, supra
note 2, at 8-11.




contended that MacDonald violated rule lOb-5 by purchasing RIT securities
based on his personal knowledge of fruitful, nonpublic business activities
that were unfolding at the time of his purchases.14
8
The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island ordered
MacDonald to disgorge the entire profit derived by virtue of the illicit trans-
actions. 149 The court neither applied nor discussed the equal footing princi-
ple. Apparently, the district court judge was simply equating the measure of
disgorgement with all gains of the wrongdoer to ensure that all unjust en-
richment was removed, a notion that the First Circuit had initially espoused
in Janigan.
On appeal, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit reversed the district court's full disgorgement order.' 50 A two-justice
majority adopted the equal footing principle, thereby limiting disgorgement
to profits realized between the time of the fraudulent purchases and the time
of general dissemination of the nonpublic information upon which MacDon-
ald traded.' In lone dissent, Chief Judge Coffin urged that the district
court's full disgorgement order be upheld.
15 2
The SEC sought and obtained a rehearing en banc on the issue of the
measure of disgorgement, maintaining that in a federal enforcement action,
an inside trader's entire profit must be disgorged in order to effectuate deter-
rence and to promote fair play in the marketplace. 153 By a three-to-two
margin, however, the en banc majority embraced the equal footing principle,
thus allowing defendant MacDonald to retain profits approximating $40,000
and requiring disgorgement of only about $18,000. 114
The majority premised its holding on a causation analysis. The court rea-
soned that public disclosure of the inside information utilized by the defend-
ant broke the causal nexus between the fraudulent purchase and subsequent
sale of the securities."' Thus, in the majority's view, the full extent of un-
just enrichment attributable to the act of inside trading is realized when the
148. Id. at 91,231-91,234.
149. Id. at 91,234. Although the court ordered full disgorgement, it denied the SEC's
request for an injunction restraining the defendant from trading. The court found "not the
slightest suggestion that he has or will enter the market." Id.
150. SEC v. MacDonald, No. 81-1356 (May 13, 1982), vacated, [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,672 (1st Cir. 1982).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. SEC v. MacDonald, [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,672
(1st Cir. 1982) (order to rehear en banc issue of the measure of disgorgement).
154. SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 47, 52-55, on remand, 568 F. Supp. 111, 114 (D.R.I.
1983).
155. See supra note 31. But see Janigan, 344 F.2d at 786 ("[T]here can be no speculation
but that the defendant actually made the profit and, once it is found that he acquired the
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inside information becomes public, and thereafter, the insider's retention and
subsequent sale of the securities is lawful because the trader is no longer
utilizing inside information. 156
Writing for the majority, Circuit Judge Aldrich noted a limitation on the
measure of disgorgement, that "defrauded sellers can recover only those ac-
cretions occurring up to a reasonable time after they discovered the
truth."' 57 Insiders' profits accruing after public disclosure should not be
subject to disgorgement, he maintained, because investors have the opportu-
nity to assess their damages and decide whether to reinvest based on the new
information. 5 '
The majority did not explain why the ability of individuals to act upon
new information either limits or is relevant to the extent of disgorgement
that may be sought by the SEC.' 59 Instead, the majority saw no legal or
equitable reason to assess liability in an SEC law enforcement action in a
manner different from a private suit." To do so, the majority reasoned,
would unfairly charge one class of inside traders more than others who com-
mitted the same fraudulent act.161 Moreover, the majority rejected the mi-
nority's contention that the measure of disgorgement should include
"damage done to investor confidence and the integrity of the nation's capital
markets."' 62 In short, the majority measured disgorgement by the lost in-
property by fraud, that the fraud was the proximate consequence of the profit, whether forsee-
able or not.").
156. The American Law Institute's proposed Federal Securities Code defines "ill-gotten
gains" as the excess over the insider's purchase price of the "value of the security as of the end
of the reasonable period after . ..the time when all material facts ...became generally
available." FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1708(b)(4) comment 2 (Proposed Official Draft
1978 & Supp. 1981). However, these provisions deal with private actions and do not contem-
plate equitable enforcement actions brought by the SEC. See MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 57
(Coffin, C.J. & Bownes, J., dissenting). Moreover, the code authorizes a district court, in its
discretion, to award 150% of the ill-gotten gains as determined under § 1708(b)(4) to provide
deterrence against securities fraud.
157. MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 53. Cf Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d at 574-76.
158. MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 53.
159. Id. at 52-55. The dissent noted:
[T]o analyze this case in term's of a seller's ability to repurchase securities after the
public disclosure of inside information seems to me to assume that the public instru-
mentality created to monitor the securities markets for the good of all stands in shoes
no larger than those of a defrauded individual.
Id. at 55.
160. MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 54. But see Commonwealth Chemical, 574 F.2d at 95; Man-
agement Dynamics, 515 F.2d at 808; Petrofunds, 420 F. Supp. at 960; National Student Mktg.
Litig., 368 F. Supp. at 1317; Lum's, 365 F. Supp. at 1046; see also supra notes 19, 33 and
accompanying text.




vestment opportunity suffered by a hypothetical investor as of the equal foot-
ing date witho-ut imputing the SEC's presence and purpose as a public
plaintiff into the measure of disgorgement.
B. The MacDonald Dissent: SEC's Presence as Securities Law Enforcer
Mandates Full Disgorgement Under Principles of Public Equity
In dissent, two members of the en banc panel contended that full disgorge-
ment is the proper measure of liability in an SEC insider trading action. 63
Stressing the critical distinction created by the SEC's presence as a public
law enforcer, the dissent argued that the measure of disgorgement must ac-
count for damage done to investor confidence and the integrity of the mar-
ketplace.' To accomplish these goals, full disgorgement of insider profits is
necessary to effectuate the SEC's role in deterring securities fraud and pro-
moting fairness in the securities industry.1
65
Dissenting for the second time on the measure of disgorgement, Chief
Judge Coffin noted the markedly inadequate deterrent effect of the majority's
holding.' 66 The insider's risk of being detected is always less than 100%,
and under equal footing, the insider could "never stand to lose more than he
stands to gain."' 67 Expounding on the SEC's role as securities law enforcer,
Chief Judge Coffin asserted that the measure of disgorgement must be differ-
ent from the amount a private plaintiff would be entitled to receive.'16 He
emphasized that the economic outcome under the majority's holding is con-
trary to the underlying purpose of disgorgement-restoration of all ill-gotten
gains.169 Therefore, he concluded, neither the court nor the SEC should be
precluded from exercising discretion to compel disgorgement of any amount
up to the full measure of profits derived from insider trading as a way to
provide deterrence and promote the Commission's enforcement role. 7
Moreover, Chief Judge Coffin argued that the majority had departed from
163. Id. at 55-58 (Coffin, C.J. & Bownes, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 55. See notes 19, 60-61 and accompanying text.
165. MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 56-57 (Coffin, C.J. & Bownes, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 56.
167. Id. Cf Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1, 25
(1980) (noting that in most instances, the effective sanction for violating insider trading laws
will be "less than the offender's expected utility in violating the law").
168. See supra note 33.
169. MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 56 (Coffin, C.J. & Bownes, J., dissenting). The dissent noted
that while certain limitations on disgorgement may be appropriate in private actions so as not
to give the plaintiff the benefit of an undue windfall, "an artificial limit on disgorgement is
wholly inappropriate in a public enforcement action by the SEC, where the policy against
windfall awards is absent." Id. See also Blatt, 583 F.2d at 1335; Commonwealth Chemical,
574 F.2d at 90; Penn Central, 425 F. Supp. at 599; E. GADSBY, supra note 1.
170. MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 55-56 (Coffin, C.J. & Brownes, J., dissenting).
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the essential principle of Janigan-that it is more appropriate to require dis-
gorgement of windfall profits flowing from a securities fraud than to allow
the wrongdoer to keep them.1 7 ' He noted that even in private suits, it is
settled law that where the nature of a fraud makes liability uncertain, doubts
are to be resolved against the wrongdoer. 172 In the dissent's view, this basic
principle has even greater vitality in an SEC enforcement action because the
Commission is a public plaintiff advancing broad societal interests as op-
posed to a private plaintiff seeking personal pecuniary gains.
173
While conceding the lack of case law directly supporting its view, the dis-
sent pointed out the lack of direct support for the majority opinion as well.
The only Commission actions where federal circuit courts applied equal
footing to inside traders were SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur and SEC v. Sha-
piro. 17  The dissent noted that in Texas Gulf Sulphur the measure of dis-
gorgement was not an issue." Additionally, the dissent interpreted the
purpose of equal footing as applied in Shapiro to be a disincentive to insider
trading-"to avoid giving him a 'heads-I-win-tails-you-lose' opportunity by
allowing him to 'keep subsequent profits but not suffer subsequent
losses.' ,176
In sum, then, the en banc panel differed sharply on the principles underly-
ing the nature of the disgorgement remedy, principally over the issue of
whether the SEC's presence as a public plaintiff mandates that a concept of
public equity be imputed into the measure of disgorgement. The pivotal
question raised by these contrasting opinions is whether compelling dis-
gorgement of only predisclosure profits in SEC enforcement actions is suffi-
cient redress and adequate deterrence against rule lOb-5 insider trading.
With this backdrop of judicial uncertainty over the measure of disgorgement
in SEC insider trading actions, Congress took the issue into its own hands by
enacting the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984.
IV. THE INSIDER TRADING SANCTIONS ACT OF 1984
Responding to the SEC's call for help in its war against insider trading,
171. See Janigan 344 F.2d at 786.
172. MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 55-56 (Coffin, C.J. & Brownes, J., dissenting); see also Affili-
ated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972) (citing Janigan); Bigelow v. RKO
Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. at 251, 264 (1946); supra note 68.
173. MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 57-58.
174. See Shapiro, 494 F.2d at 1301; Texas Gulf Sulfur, 446 F.2d at 1301. See also supra
notes 95-107, 123-33 and accompanying text.




Congress enacted the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA). 1' Pre-
mised largely upon the inadequate deterrent force of present usage of the
disgorgement remedy,"' 8 the ITSA's major provision provides the Commis-
sion with the power to seek an assessment of treble damages against persons
who trade on the basis of material nonpublic information.179 Additionally,
the ITSA amends section 32 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by in-
creasing from $10,000 to $100,000, the maximum penalty that may be im-
posed for willful violations of any provision of the 1934 Act. 80 In providing
the SEC with these two powerful tools of enforcement, Congress has clearly
reasserted its intent to preserve the integrity of the nation's capital markets
and maintain the confidence of the investing public.'
To effectuate passage of the ITSA, the Commission was asked to consider
and respond to several changes not included in the original bill submitted by
the SEC.' s2 One of these changes, now adopted by Congress, defines treble
damages as three times the "profit gained" or "loss avoided" as measured
between the time of the purchase or sale of the securities and a reasonable
time after disclosure of the nonpublic information.18 3 Although this provi-
sion is an implicit codification of the equal footing concept, the definition
was framed only for purposes of computing treble damages. By adopting
this definition, Congress did not endorse the First Circuit's holding in SEC v.
MacDonald" 4 because the Commission may seek treble damages "instead
177. Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264, § 1 (1984) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c, 78o, 78t,
78u, 78ff (1982)).
178. See 129 CONG. REC. H7011 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1983) (statement of Rep. Wirth)
("Disgorgement of profits simply puts [the inside trader] . . . back in the position he would
have been if he had obeyed the law in the first place."); see also 130 CONG. REC. S8912-13,
(Daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. D'Amato) ("It is evident that current law lacks
any real deterrence to engaging in insider trading . . . . There is little disincentive to engage
in insider trading since the punishment, if caught, is merely being restored to the monetary
position from which you began.").
179. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, supra note 177, amending 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d).
180. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, supra note 177, § 78ff.
181. "Insider trading threatens our capital markets by undermining the public's expecta-
tions of fair and honest securities markets where all participants play by the same rules." 129
CONG. REC. at H7012 (statement of Rep. Wirth).
182. Id. at 7013.
183. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, supra note 177, § (2)(C) (amending 15
U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)).
184. See CONFERENCE REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS,
CONSUMER PROTECTION, AND FINANCE at 8 (1983) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE RE-
PORT]. CONF. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1983) ("By adopting a definition of
'profit gained or loss avoided' for purposes of this legislation, however, the Committee does not
endorse the court's holding in SEC v. MacDonald."). The Subcommittee noted that the issue
of post-disclosure windfall profits rarely arises because inside traders seldom hold securities
long after disclosure of the nonpublic information upon which they traded. Id. at 29.
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of, or in addition to," any other remedy it is presently empowered to seek. 
185
The ITSA's treble damages enforcement provision is intended to serve as
the SEC's principal enforcement tool to combat insider trading.' 8 6 Clearly,
by promulgating this remedy, Congress evinced its dissatisfaction with the
efficacy of the disgorgement remedy and the limits placed on it by modern
federal courts. 18 7 Nonetheless, it remains for the courts to determine both
the usage and construction of the equal footing principle codified within the
treble damages clause of the ITSA. It is noteworthy that treble damages
under the ITSA will remove all insider profits only where the inside trader's
profits are no more than three times the equal footing measure. Where the
inside trader's profits are more than three times the equal footing measure,
as in Janigan, treble damages will not remove all profit from the wrongdoer.
In such cases, though, it would seem inappropriate to construe this provision
as precluding the Commission's right to exercise its discretion to seek full
disgorgement in order to prevent unjust enrichment.1 8  The ITSA evinces
congressional intent to increase the enforcement powers of the SEC, and it
would appear to circumvent the bill's underlying purpose to construe any of
its provisions as limiting the Commission's power to redress insider trading.
On the other hand, it is arguable that the ITSA codified the maximum
profit that an inside trader may be required to disgorge, and that a further
assessment would constitute an unjust penalty. Certainly this point will be
argued by the inside trader whose fraud is revealed and whose profits exceed
treble damages under the ITSA. Although it remains for the courts to con-
strue and apply the ITSA, by analyzing the origin, purpose, and develop-
ment of both the disgorgement remedy and the equal footing concept,
certain postulations as to the remedial impact of the ITSA may be set forth.
185. Congress noted that passage of the ITSA now vests the SEC with three remedies with
which to combat insider trading. "[F]irst, an order enjoining the violator from breaking the
law again; second, disgorgement of illicit profits; and third, a civil penalty of up to three times
the profit gained or loss avoided." CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 183, at 8.
186. "Because of the inadequate deterrent provided by present enforcement remedies for
insider trading, the Commission, in September 1982, requested Congress to enact legislation to
provide a civil penalty of an amount up to three times the profit gained or loss avoided from
insider trading. This legislation embodies that request." CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note
183, at 8. "The Committee believes that providing the Commission the power to seek a civil
penalty is the best way to accomplish the goal of deterring inside trading." Id. at 13.
187. See supra note 178.
188. See R.J. Allen, 386 F. Supp. at 881 ("The effective enforcement of of the federal secur-
ities laws requires that the Commission be able to make violations unprofitable."); Cf Blatt,
583 F.2d at 1325; Commonwealth Chemical., 574 F.2d at 90; Penn Central, 425 F. Supp. at
593; Golconda Mining, 327 F. Supp. at 259; SEC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 19; E. GAD-
SBY, supra note 1.
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V. THE DISGORGEMENT REMEDY IN SEC RULE lOb-5 INSIDER
TRADING SUITS: PERSPECTIVE AND DIRECTION
On balance, it appears that bare application of equal footing in SEC rule
lOb-5 insider trading actions controverts case law interpretation of the pur-
pose of disgorgement, s9 the SEC's objectives in bringing such suits, 190 and
recently expressed congressional intent.'' The MacDonald dissent and the
enactment of the ITSA reflect the inadequacies of, and disenchantment with,
modern application of the disgorgement remedy in SEC insider trading ac-
tions.'9 2 While the MacDonald dissent conceded a lack of case law directly
supporting its position, a careful reading of prior law demonstrates the ab-
sence of case law supporting the majority view as well.
Initially, federal courts applied the notion of equal footing under rule lOb-
5 in cases resulting from the infamous Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation. 93 The
remedies applied in those cases, however, were the culmination of the most
complex securities litigation in history and arose from a spectacular fact pat-
tern surrounding the misleading press release in which Texas Gulf Sulphur
falsely dispelled rumors of its now legendary precious metal strike. Indeed,
in Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, the first federal circuit case to answer the
question of remedy in the Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation, the Tenth Circuit
clearly stated that the uniqueness of the litigation required that its remedy
not be reviewed as controlling precedent beyond the facts of the case because
"the rule styled by this court is fashioned for these unprecedented circum-
stances."' 94 Further, Mitchell was a private suit and public equity could not
have been an issue as it is in SEC enforcement actions. 95
Moreover, both Mitchell and SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur framed remedies
premised essentially upon restitutional principles and did not apply disgorge-
ment. 196 Restitution is designed to make private parties whole, a concept
189. See, e.g., Blatt, 583 F.2d at 1325; Commonwealth Chemical, 574 F.2d at 90; Janigan,
344 F.2d at 786; Penn. Central, 425 F. Supp. at 593. See supra notes 3, 12, 19, 62-72, 139-42
and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 19, 33, 60-61, 145, and accompanying text. Cf, Golconda Mining, 327
F. Supp. at 259 ("To permit... the return of... illicit profits would impair the full impact
of the deterrent force that is essential if adequate enforcement of the securities acts is to be
achieved.").
191. See Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, supra notes 177-88 and accompanying
text.
192. See supra notes 162-75, 177, 185 and accompanying text.
193. See Mitchell, 466 F.2d at 90; Texas Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d at 1301; supra notes 84-
108 and accompanying text.
194. See Mitchell, 446 F.2d at 105.
195. See R.J. Allen, 386 F. Supp. at 881; supra notes 19, 33, 60-61 and accompanying text.
196. Although Mitchell did not refer to its remedy as restitution and indeed claimed it was
not applying that remedy, the remedy it did apply is founded upon notions of mitigation,
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inapplicable to Commission suits where the SEC has no direct pecuniary
interest and appears as a "public plaintiff" on behalf of public equity.197 By
applying restitution in the guise of equal footing in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur, the Second Circuit refrained from exploring the scope of its reme-
dial powers because it did not factor the SEC's enforcement role into its
remedial equation."98 The court applied equal footing apparently to pre-
clude the virtually limitless liability that would otherwise have been assessed
had the court attempted to apply full disgorgement.199 Still, by applying this
measure of liability, the court permitted the defendants to retain a portion of
the fruits of illicit conduct, a result that provides no deterrence against rule
lOb-5 insider trading.
In both SEC v. Shapiro and SEC v. Commonwealth Chemical, however,
the Second Circuit broke new ground and broadened its remedial breadth by
applying equal footing to effectuate disgorgement of "paper profits," gains in
market value lost when the post-disclosure retention of tainted securities
proved unprofitable. 2" The MacDonald dissent appropriately noted that re-
quiring full disgorgement of phantom profits in such cases should not be
read as precedent for permitting the retention of actual profits realized by an
inside trader after the equal footing date.2 °1 Yet, relying on Shapiro as well
as the Texas Gulf Sulphur Cases, the MacDonald majority rendered that
interpretation in an instance where the market value of the illegally
purchased stock rose after the equal footing period. By using equal footing,
the majority allowed the wrongdoer to keep windfall profits resulting from
his post-disclosure retention of the tainted securities.2°2
Because it is premised primarily on a causation analysis, the MacDonald
holding and conclusion appear shallow. First, the nature of the marketplace
itself is speculative, and because of the risk of market fluctuations, the inside
trader's retention of stock after the material information utilized has been
which are akin to restitution. See Mitchell, 446 F.2d at 106 (relief would be denied from point
where plaintiffs did not exercise due diligence). In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, on the other
hand, the Court specifically applied restitution. 446 F.2d at 1307-09.
197. See also MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 55-58; Commonwealth Chemical, 574 F.2d at 95;
Petrofunds, 420 F. Supp. at 960; supra notes 19, 33, 60-61 and accompanying text.
198. In both Mitchell and SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, however, the Commission was first
establishing its right to seek any form of money damages and was well satisfied with any form
of monetary restoration. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 107 (referencing the nature and extent of liability faced by the Texas
Gulf Sulphur Company if all the plaintiffs were granted the relief they sought).
200. See Commonwealth Chemical, 574 F.2d at 90; Shapiro, 494 F.2d at 301; see also supra
notes 123-42 and accompanying text.
201. See MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 56 (Coffin, C.J. & Bownes, J., dissenting); see also supra
note 145 and accompanying text.
202. MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 52-55.
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revealed is also a gamble. The Supreme Court has clearly stated that equity
requires the wrongdoer to bear the risk where the nature of the wrong cre-
ates speculative damages.2"3 This concept should apply with full vigor to
insider trading because market value fluctuations resulting from disclosure
of material information make the extent of insider liability an uncertain and
highly contested issue.2" The measure of insider liability is further clouded
in SEC suits where damages are sought on behalf of public equity, as op-
posed to remedies designed to make private parties whole.2°5 In measuring
disgorgement in Commission actions, courts must shape the remedy to effec-
uate the SEC's duty to deter violations and promote fair play in the market-
place because the capital formation necessary to effectuate economic growth
is largely dependent on investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of
the securities industry.20 6 Clearly, there is now substantial doubt whether
bare application of the equal footing concept is appropriate in the context of
a Commission suit.20 7 Consequently, it would comport with Supreme Court
decisional law to resolve this doubt against the inside trader.20 8
While the equal footing concept is not without merit,2 9 in the context of
SEC suits it effectively undermines the deterrent force needed to combat in-
sider trading.210 Damage done to investor confidence and other societal
harm are not considered under this measure of insider liability.21 Using
equal footing in a context that allows the inside trader to retain profits con-
troverts Janigan v. Taylor, which held that equity requires the inside trader
203. See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265. (1945); see also Affiliated
Ute, 406 U.S. at 155; Janigan, 344 F.2d at 786; supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Janigan, 344 F.2d at 786;
Blau, 286 F.2d at 786; Adler, 267 F.2d at 840; Smolowe, 136 F.2d at 231.
205. See Commonwealth Chemical, 574 F.2d at 95; see also supra note 3.
206. See CONF. REP., supra note 183, at 2; see also supra note 181.
207. See MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 55-58; Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, supra note
177, § 2(a); see also supra notes 177-88 and accompanying text.
208. See Bigelow, 327 U.S. at 265; accord Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 155. See also MacDon-
ald, 699 F.2d at 55 (majority noting that "although we have distinguished Janigan on the
facts, we do not depart from the principle that doubts are to be resolved against the defrauding
party").
209. See MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 55 (dissent noting that the majority's view would be
"unanswerable" in insider trading cases involving "private individuals, one defrauded and the
other defrauding").
210. See id. Accord Shapiro, 494 F.2d at 1309; see also supra note 178 (Congress noting
that even full disgorgement merely restores the inside trader to the monetary position he would
have been in if he had not violated the law in the first place). Cf Management Dynamics, 515
F.2d at 808 ("crucial error" for dependantso assume that SEC enforcement actions are gov-
erned by same criteria as private suits).
211. See MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 55 (Coffin, C.J. & Bownes, J., dissenting); see also supra
notes 33, 60, 180 and accompanying text.
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to disgorge speculative, unforseeable profits.2 12 In MacDonald, the defend-
ant's post-disclosure retention of securities was speculative and the profits
resulting were unforseeable. By applying equal footing, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals permitted the defendant to retain windfall profits. Fur-
ther, a decision to retain the securities may be directly related to the actual
fraud as where the inside trader keeps the securites in order to make the
violation less obvious. In such a case, application of equal footing would
permit the insider to retain the unforseeable fruits of the act of concealing a
securities fraud.
Although Janigan was a private suit in which the court could not have
applied equal footing because there was no disclosure date, the spirit of the
holding should logically apply with even greater vitality to SEC public law
enforcement actions.2 13 In Commission suits it cannot be argued that the
plaintiff could have invested upon disclosure of the previously nonpublic in-
formation and mitigated losses. Rather, the plaintiff is a public servant pro-
tecting broad societal interests and federal courts should account for those
interests by applying the remedy that achieves the maximum deterrent ef-
fect.2 14 Otherwise, the remedy equates the Commission with a private
plaintiff, thereby undermining the SEC's role as statutory enforcer of federal
securities laws.2 15
Additionally, equal footing places the SEC in the remedial shoes of a pri-
vate plaintiff, a result that is contrary to case law,216 and now, contrary to
express congressional intent.2 7 The enactment of the Insider Trading Sanc-
tions Act of 1984 expressly places the SEC in greater stead than private
parties by empowering the Commission with the discretionary authority to
seek three times equal footing profits in addition to any other relief it is
presently entitled to request.21 8 By ensuring that the Commission's remedial
212. Janigan, 344 F.2d at 786.
213. See MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 57-58 (Coffin, C.J. & Bownes, J., dissenting) (finding
more "vitality" in Janigan, noting that although some courts have refused to apply Janigan in
private suits where the fraudulently purchased securities are publicy traded "the SEC's reme-
dial powers are not so restricted").
214. See Shapiro, 494 F.2d at 1309; Manor Nursing, 458 F.2d at 1104; Golconda Mining,
327 F. Supp. at 259.
215. See supra notes 196, 212 and accompanying text; see also Petrofunds, 420 F. Supp. at
960 ("[R]elief sought by the SEC... cannot fairly be analogized to any form of relief avail-
able at common law. . .[but] springs out of the policy of public enforcement of the provisions
of the securities laws and exists as an exercise of the equity powers of the federal courts.").
216. See Petrofunds, 420 F. Supp. at 960 ("[T]he SEC in no way stands in the shoes of a
private plaintiff with respect to its claims for ancillary relief. ... ); see also supra notes 33,
196 and accompanying text.
217. See generally Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, supra notes 177-88 and accompa-
nying text.
218. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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relief is not limited by traditional principles of restitution, Congress clearly
evinced its intent to assist the SEC in combating insider trading.219 Restitu-
tional principles are generally appropriate in private actions where the rem-
edy is intended to protect investors by making them whole.22° Such
concepts, however, have little relevance in SEC suits where the measure of
disgorgement should be all tainted profits so that the remedy removes any
unjust enrichment and serves as a deterrent mechanism.221
With the passage of the Insider Trading Sanction Act, federal courts are
now vested with discretion to shape any one of several forms of remedial
relief in instances of SEC rule lob-5 insider trading actions. At a minimum,
federal courts will require restoration of profits as measured under the equal
footing principle.222 Secondly, under section 2 of the ITSA, courts may
compel disgorgement of up to three times the profit gained or loss avoided as
of the equal footing date.223 Third, under general principles of equity, where
insider profits exceed three times equal footing, federal courts may compel
full disgorgement to ensure restoration of all unjust enrichment.
224
Although the MacDonald majority refused to apply full disgorgement, the
ITSA supports the minority's view that the SEC may seek relief sufficient to
account for damage done to investor confidence and the integrity of the mar-
ketplace.225 Furthermore, under the updated version of Section 32 of the
1934 Act, a $100,000 penalty fee may also be assessed for willful viola-
tions.226 Thus, in a proper case, to account for these broad societal interests,
the Commission may seek full disgorgement as well as a penalty assessment
to accomplish express congressional objectives.
219. Id. See also 129 CONG. REC., supra note 178, at H7012 (statement of Rep. Wirth)
(the ITSA "gives the Securities and Exchange Commission the tools it needs to combat insider
trading and other abuses in the securities markets.").
220. See D. DOBBS, supra note 5.
221. See generally MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 55-58 (Coffin, C.J. & Bownes, J., dissenting);
Blatt, 583 F.2d at 1335; Penn Central, 425 F. Supp. at 599; E. GADSBY, supra note 1; see also
supra notes 12-13, 162-75 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 52-55; SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d at
1307-08; supra notes 96-107, 153-61 and accompanying text.
223. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, supra note 177 § 2(a) (amending 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u(d).
224. Although the Act limits the measure of disgorgement to three times equal footing
profits when the Commission proceeds under § 2(a), it does not thereby prohibit the SEC from
seeking full disgorgement where inside profits exceed treble damages under the ITSA. Con-
gress specifically noted that § 2(a) may be used instead of, or in addition to, any remedies
presently available to the Commission. See Conference Report, supra note 183 and accompa-
nying text. "Enactment of this legislation would have no effect on the Commission's existing
independent authority to bring civil actions for injunctions and ancillary relief." Id. at 9.
225. See supra notes 178, 181 and accompanying text.
226. Insider Trading Sanctions Act, supra note 177, § 3 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78ff). This
provision is not limited to insider trading.
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Federal courts have yet to face the issue of the proper measure of dis-
gorgement in light of the recent enactment of the ITSA, and at this point
how they will rule on this issue is a matter of speculation. Which measure of
disgorgement is appropriate will doubtless depend on the facts and circum-
stances of each case. It is likely, though, that federal courts will shift away
from equal footing as the sole measure of insider trading liability in SEC
suits,"' particularly in light of the ITSA and the congressional intent sur-
rounding its passage. Federal courts that continue to use the equal footing
measure of disgorgement must now consider adding up to three times that
amount onto the profits that must be restored under rudimentary equal foot-
ing. Furthermore, where the civil treble damages penalty provison is insuffi-
cient to capture all insider profits, full disgorgement appears to be the only
remedy that will serve as an adequate deterrent mechanism and remove all
unjust enrichment.2 28
Under the language of the ITSA, it is clear that the SEC can seek greater
monetary relief than may a private party.2 2 9 It would appear, then, that
contrary to the MacDonald holding, federal courts are entitled to compel full
disgorgement whenever necessary to ensure the restoration of all unjust en-
richment and account for the public equity interests at stake in SEC enforce-
ment suits. Congress has now established that such societal interests should
be factored into the measure of disgorgement. Therefore, MacDonald's prec-
edential value is tenuous at best, because the majority rationale has now been
subverted by express congressional intent. Thus, armed with the ITSA
treble damages clause and the amendment of section 32 of the 1934 Act
providing for fines of up to $100,000, the SEC may now seek disgorgement
that serves as a true disincentive to insider trading. It appears, then, that
federal courts must now observe congressional intent and find that the SEC
is entitled to a measure of disgorgement that is greater than that available to
a private plaintiff.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the seminal decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, equal footing-
the restoration of insider profits accruing before disclosure of material, non-
227. See supra note 177. See also Cheney & Sibears, supra note 2, at 12:
The cases reflect a transition from reliance on the law of damages and restitution
to a consideration of disgorgement, not only as a way to deprive wrongdoers of ill-
gotten gains, but as a means to deter future violations . . . and to prevent injury to
the public interest defined as preserving capital markets that are equitable and fair
228. See, e.g., Janigan, 344 F.2d at 786; supra notes 62-72.
229. See supra note 185.
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public information-has emerged as the minimum measure of disgorgement
in SEC insider trading actions under rule lOb-5. The principle is well-suited
to private actions where defrauded parties can mitigate losses by investing in
securities upon learning of the previously nonpublic information. But,
where there is no subsequent disclosure or no public market for the stock, as
in Janigan, full disgorgement is the appropriate measure of liability because
private parties do not have the opportunity to mitigate their losses.
In SEC enforcement actions, however, full disgorgement may always be
the proper remedy because application of equal footing raises significant
problems. First, equal footing places the SEC in the shoes of a private plain-
tiff, a result that is contrary to both case law and congressional intent in
creating the SEC to serve as statutory guardian of federal securities laws.
Second, equal footing does not account for diffuse societal harm, which in-
cludes damage to investor confidence and violation of the integrity of the
securities marketplace. It is the Commission's duty to protect these societal
interests as well as reproach transgressions of those interests. Third, equal
footing is based on a causal relation analysis that is largely flawed. In a
private suit, such an analysis is appropriate because disclosure gives rise to
the ability to mitigate losses. But an analysis premised on the concept of
mitigation has no place in a Commission action where the SEC has no direct
pecuniary interest in the outcome of the litigation. Rather, the Commission
sues on behalf of public equity to ensure that wrongdoing is made unprofita-
ble and to deter future violations.
In addition, Congress evinced dissatisfaction with the use of equal footing
in Commission suits by enacting the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984,
which vests the SEC with the power to seek three times equal footing profits.
The Act formally establishes the Commission's power to seek monetary re-
lief greater than that to which a private plaintiff is entitled, and thus, effec-
tively vitiates the rationale of MacDonald because the majority placed the
SEC in the same remedial shoes as a private plaintiff. Although the breadth
of treble damages under the Insider Trading Sanctions Act will usually be
sufficient to capture all insider profits, instances will arise where the insider's
profits exceed the scope of this remedy. In such cases, principles of public
equity, deterrence, and unjust enrichment, as espoused by the MacDonald
dissent, should guide courts in fashioning a remedy that removes all tainted
profit from the wrongdoer. The only remedy that accomplishes this is full
disgorgement.
Thomas C. Mira
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